Woensdag 12 maart 2003
Vanaf half 11 is er koffie en chocola.
||Marc Meertens (KUN)
||Evolution and the Nash-equilibrium
||11:00 - 12:00
||CK N4 (N3045)
The most well-known and extensively used solution concept for applications of
(non-cooperative) game theory is the Nash-equilibrium
And after the movie `A Beautiful Mind'
this solution concept became even
known to the `outside world'. However, it gives rise to the questions how
players know that a Nash-equilibrium will be played and which
Nash-equilibrium is to be played if a game has more than one Nash-equilibrium.
In an attempt to answer these questions, game-theorists started to investigate
`evolutionary' explanations of Nash-equilibria. This was motivated by the work
of biologists in game theory, in particular, the work of Smith and Price
(1973)). The idea is to replace each player, who is assumed to
be rational, by a population of non-rational individuals (for instance, animals)
and to show that over time these populations have a tendency towards
Nash-equilibria. An approach to formalize this idea is by a dynamic selection
process based on a system of (ordinary) differential equations.
The goal of my talk will be to give an insight to the concept of the
Nash-equilibrium and to discuss some results of a dynamic selection process,
defined by Jos Potters, Hans Reijnierse and myself.